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THE DEMISE OF THE SEAL AND THE VALIDITY OF 
CERTAIN DEEDS*
In Ireland, the rule of law which required an individual to seal a deed to ensure 
its valid execution was abolished by s.64(1)(a) of the Land and Conveyancing 
Law Reform Act 2009 (the “2009 Act”).1 From December 1, 2009 a deed shall 
be validly executed provided it is signed by the individual in the presence of 
a witness; or it is signed by a person at the individual’s direction, given in the 
presence of a witness; or the individual’s signature is acknowledged by him or 
her in the presence of a witness. The witness must also attest that signature.2 As 
these new formalities operate only from the commencement date, an interesting 
question arises in relation to the validity of thousands of deeds executed before 
December 1, 2009. Many deeds executed since the 1970s bear no obvious 
evidence of having been sealed (such as a red sticker next to the signature of 
the grantor) and it could be argued that they have not been validly executed and 
are therefore legally ineffective. 
It is perhaps unfortunate, although not in this writer’s view critical, that the 
drafters of the 2009 Act did not take the opportunity, in this particular context, 
to retrospectively clarify the effectiveness of such deeds. Such an approach 
was taken by s.64(4) of the 2009 Act, which provides that a deed, “whenever 
created”, has the effect of an indenture, although not indented or expressed to be 
an indenture. A retrospective curative approach was taken in relation to deeds 
which did not comply with certain technical requirements which the 2009 Act 
abolished. For example, s.67(4) provides that a conveyance of unregistered 
land without words of limitation “executed before commencement” passes the 
fee simple or the largest estate or interest which the grantor had the power to 
convey. Also, the abolition of the rule against perpetuities is stated to apply to 
any interest in property “whenever created”. Although these changes in the 
law operate in respect of older deeds, this retrospectivity is subject to certain 
limitations designed to protect a person who has relied on the defect in the 
deed to their detriment, or where an interest was disposed of or acquired as a 
result of the defect.3 An equivalent position could have been adopted to cure 
any perceived defect in deeds executed before December 1, 2009 arising from 
the absence of evidence that they had been sealed at the time of execution. In 
the absence of such a statutory provision, this article examines whether such 
*  I would like to thank Joseph O’Meara, formerly a partner with Holmes O’Malley Sexton, 
Solicitors, who originally raised this question and generously consented to the broader 
circulation of this opinion. I would also like thank the anonymous reviewers for their 
comments and suggestions. All errors remain my own. 
1. A company registered in the State must continue to execute deeds under the seal of the 
company in accordance with its Articles of Association, see s.64(2)(b)(ii) of the 2009 
Act.
2. See s.64(2)(b)(i) of the 2009 Act. The deed must also be delivered as a deed by the person 
executing it or by a person authorised to do so on that person’s behalf: see s.64(2)(c). 
Section 64(1)(b) abolishes any rule of law which requires authority to deliver a deed to 
be given by deed. 
3. See ss.17 and 67(4) of the 2009 Act. 
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deeds have been validly executed in light of the relevant case law, academic 
commentary and prevailing conveyancing practice. As mortgagors increasingly 
run into difficulties in making loan repayments and mortgagees seek to enforce 
their security, it is easy to imagine a challenge being made to the validity of 
certain mortgage deeds on this basis. 
THE COMMON LAW REQUIREMENT FOR A SEAL
In Ireland, the requirement for the personal seal of the parties to a deed to 
ensure its proper execution was imposed by the common law. As was set out 
in Goddard’s case, 
“There were [by the common law] but three things of the essence and 
substance of a deed, that is to say, writing on paper or parchment, sealing 
and delivery, and if it had these three … the deed was sufficient.”4 
This requirement for a seal was unsurprising in medieval times, as it was the 
only way of effectively authenticating a document before handwriting became 
common. Originally, molten wax was put on the deed and affixed by a piece of 
ribbon to keep the wax on the parchment. The individual impressed on the hot 
wax his own crest or coat of arms, often by using a signet ring. Other methods 
of sealing were, however, permissible, for example, by using “a stick or any 
such like thing which doth make a print”, or even by “biting the wax with 
the foretooth”.5 In more recent times, a small red circular sticker was used. 
These red stickers or wafers were mass-produced and generally affixed by a 
solicitor or a secretary and not by the grantor himself. As Dankwerts J. noted 
in Stromdale & Ball Ltd v Burden: 
“Time was when the placing of the party’s seal was the essence of due 
execution; signature was not indeed necessary to make a deed valid … 
But with the spread of education, the signature became of importance for 
the authentication of documents … .”6 
Although it has long been the practice to include the signatures of the parties to 
the deed (or, at least, the signature of the grantor) and to have these signatures 
attested, this was not a legal requirement in Ireland until s.64 of the Land and 
Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 made it so. 
In England, by way of contrast, the common law requirement for a seal was 
bolstered by legislative references. Section 73 of the Law of Property Act 1925 
provided that sealing alone was no longer sufficient to execute a deed and made 
4. (1584) 2 Co. Rep. 4b, 3 Leon. 100. See also, Blennerhassett v Day (1813) Beat. 468 at 
470 (per Lord Manners L.C.). 
5. D.C. Hoath, “The Sealing of Documents—Fact or Fiction” (1980) 43 Modern Law 
Review 415. 
6. [1952] 1 Ch. 223 at 230. 
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it essential to include the disponer’s signature or mark on the deed. Similarly, 
to create a valid power of attorney in England pursuant to s.1(1) of the Powers 
of Attorney Act 1971, the instrument had to be signed and sealed by (or by 
the direction of and in the presence of) the donor. Attestation, although not a 
requirement until the commencement of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1989 (the “1989 Act”), was common conveyancing practice.7
In 1985, the Law Commission of England and Wales provisionally 
recommended the abolition of the seal as a necessary requirement for the 
execution of a deed by an individual. It commented as follows: 
“Invalidating a document because of the lack of a small circle of red paper 
may well seem to laymen, if not to lawyers, to be a clear illustration of the 
antiquated state of some areas of the English law. The seal is a redundant 
formality without substantive purpose and easily overlooked.”8
Others had previously referred to the doctrine of the seal as a “legal fiction”9 
and “mumbo jumbo”.10 Quite apart from any substantial reason for requiring 
a seal, the Law Commission also referred to the need to resolve the uncertain 
state of the law as to what constitutes a valid seal.11 This uncertainty had arisen 
due to certain case law that adopted a very lenient approach in this respect and 
which shall be discussed below. The Commission’s recommendation to abolish 
the requirement for a seal was implemented by s.1(3)(a) of the Law of Property 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, which provides that a deed is validly 
executed by an individual if it is signed by him in the presence of a witness 
who attests his signature, or if it is signed at the individual’s direction in his 
presence, and in the presence of two witnesses, who each attest his signature.12 
The 1989 Act also amended the Powers of Attorney Act 1971 by requiring a 
7. K. Gray and S. Gray, Elements of Land Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
para.8.1.91.
8. Law Commission, Transfer of Land—Formalities for Deeds and Escrows (Working 
Paper No. 93, 1985), p.15. The Law Commission’s final recommendation for abolition 
was made in its Report on Deeds and Escrows (Law Com. No. 163, 1987), p.4.
9. As per Goddard J. in a memorandum concerning contracts under seal incorporated into 
the Sixth Interim Report of the Law Revision Committee on Statute of Frauds and the 
Doctrine of Consideration (Cmd 5449, 1937), p.35. 
10. As per Lord Wilberforce in the Parliamentary debate on the Powers of Attorney Bill 
1971: Hansard HL Vol.315, Col.1213, February 25, 1971. 
11. See Law Commission, Transfer of Land—Formalities for Deeds and Escrows (Working 
Paper No. 93, 1985), p.6; Law Commission, Deeds and Escrows (Law Com. No. 163, 
1987), p.3.
12. Note that the deed must also be delivered by the individual or a person authorised to do so 
on his behalf, see s.1(3)(b) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. 
Section 1(5) of the 1989 Act provides that where a solicitor, duly certified notary public, 
licensed conveyancer or an agent or employee of a solicitor, duly certificated notary public 
or licensed conveyancer, in the course of or in connection with a transaction involving the 
disposition or creation of an interest in land, purports to deliver an instrument as a deed 
on behalf of a party to the instrument, it shall be conclusively presumed in favour of a 
purchaser that he is authorised so to deliver the instrument.
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power of attorney to be executed by the donor “as if it was a deed”.13 Thus, the 
requirement for sealing was abolished and the requirement for attestation was 
introduced.14 
FIRST NATIONAL SECURITIES LTD v JONES15
In the absence of any reported Irish case law dealing with the sealing 
requirement in modern deeds, it is helpful to consider the English case law 
which governed the matter prior to the reforms introduced by the 1989 Act. 
As shall be discussed, the significance of these authorities has to be considered 
against a backdrop of certain differences between the jurisdictions in relation 
to legal context and prevailing conveyancing practices.
The most persuasive authority, in this writer’s opinion, is the decision of the 
English Court of Appeal in First National Securities Ltd v Jones (the “Jones 
case”). Not only is it the most recent and directly relevant authority, it also 
provides a helpful overview of earlier case law16 and explains and distinguishes 
certain cases which adopted a more stringent approach in relation to the 
requirement for a seal.17 In the Jones case, the plaintiff bank agreed to lend 
the defendants money to be secured by a legal charge on property owned by 
the defendant. The charge was in the bank’s standard form, which included the 
standard testimonium: “In witness whereof the mortgagor has hereunto set his 
hand and seal the day and year first before written”. Underneath was a circle 
printed on the document containing the letters “LS” (for locus sigilli, the place 
of the seal). The form also included the standard execution and attestation 
clause, “Signed, sealed and delivered by the above-named mortgagor in the 
presence of …”, with a space for the witness’s name and address. The signature 
of the first defendant appeared across the printed circle. There was no wax seal, 
wafer or any impression on the deed. When the plaintiff brought an action for 
possession after the defendant fell into arrears with his repayments of the loan, 
the action was dismissed at first instance on the ground that the legal charge 
was not under seal. In allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that in 
modern practice, documents intended to be executed as deeds frequently bore 
no wax or wafer seal, but had a printed circle sometimes inscribed with the 
letters “LS” where formerly the seal would probably have been placed, which 
was intended to serve the purpose of a seal if the document was delivered 
as the deed of the party executing it. The court was satisfied that there was 
sufficient evidence that the document had been executed by the defendant as 
13. Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 Sch.1.
14. Note that similar reforms were introduced in Northern Ireland by art.3 of the Law 
Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Northern Ireland) Order 2005. 
15. First National Securities Ltd v Jones [1978] 1 Ch. 109.
16. Including Re Sandilands (1871) LR 6 CP 411 and Stromdale & Ball Ltd v Burden [1952] 
Ch. 223.
17. Namely, Re Balkis Consolidated Co Ltd (1888) 58 LT 300; and National Provisional 
Bank of England v Jackson (1886) 33 Ch D 1. 
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his deed.18 The comments of Sir David Cairns arguably went further in his 
respect, by omitting any reference to the printed circle:
“I am sure that many documents intended by all parties to be deeds are 
now executed without any further formality than the signature opposite 
the words ‘Signed, sealed and delivered’ usually in the presence of a 
witness, and I think it would be lamentable if the validity of documents 
so executed could be successfully challenged.”19 (emphasis added.)
The court relied on two authorities: Re Sandilands20 and Stromdale & 
Ball Ltd v Burden.21 The deed in the former case had pieces of green ribbon 
attached to the places where the seals should have been. It included the 
standard execution and attestation clause, “signed, sealed and delivered … 
in the presence of …” and the signatures were duly attested. There was also 
a certificate of two commissioners stating that the ladies who had executed 
the deed had appeared personally before them and produced the deed, 
acknowledging it to be their deed. No physical seal was ever put on the deed. 
Bovill C.J. said that there was prima facie evidence that the deed was sealed at 
the time of its execution and acknowledgement by the parties. He noted: “To 
constitute a sealing, neither wax nor wafer, nor a piece of paper, nor even an 
impression is necessary.”22 The view expressed by Montague Smith J. in Re 
Sandilands was described by Buckley L.J. in the Jones case as authority for the 
proposition that the attestation of the execution of the deed as being “signed, 
sealed and delivered” as the party’s deed is prima facie evidence that the deed 
was sealed.23 
Stromdale & Ball Ltd v Burden concerned the execution of a deed of licence 
which conferred an option on the plaintiff to buy a leasehold premises. The 
plaintiff took steps to exercise the option and sought specific performance of 
the agreement to sell the premises. The defendant denied that she had sealed 
the document containing the option and claimed that it never had the legal 
effect of a deed. Danckwerts J. noted that the defendant’s evidence was very 
vague on whether the wafer seal was on the document when she signed it, 
but he thought it likely that it had been. He concluded that if it was there 
when she signed, the document was effectively executed as a deed. He noted 
that the signature had replaced the seal in importance for the authentication of 
documents and continued as follows:
“Meticulous persons executing a deed may still place their finger on the 
wax seal or wafer on the document, but it appears to me that, at the 
present day, if a party signs a document bearing wax or wafer or other 
18. Fn.15 above at 118.
19. Fn.15 above at 121.
20. Re Sandilands (1871) LR 6 CP 411.
21. Stromdale & Ball Ltd v Burden [1952] Ch. 2.
22. Fn.20 above at 413. 
23. Fn.15 above at 115.
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indication of a seal, with the intention of executing the document as a 
deed, that is sufficient adoption or recognition of the seal to amount to 
due execution as a deed.”24 
He added that, as the document which had been sent by the defendant’s 
solicitors to the plaintiff’s solicitors contained the standard testimonium, 
execution and attestation clauses and bore a red wafer seal, he was unable 
to see how the defendant could now be allowed to say she did not seal the 
document. He noted: “It seems to me the clearest case of estoppel possible.”25 
This estoppel argument shall be discussed below. 
In the Jones case, Buckley L.J. also discussed two cases, Re Balkis 
Consolidated Co Ltd26 and National Provisional Bank of England v Jackson27 
(the Jackson case), which adopted a more stringent approach to the requirement 
for a seal. Re Balkis Consolidated Co Ltd concerned a deed of transfer of shares 
which had been signed by a shareholder, named Arnott, at his stockbroker’s 
office and witnessed by a clerk of the office as having been “signed, sealed 
and delivered” by him. There was no seal on it or wafer, just a circle with the 
words “place for seal” printed within it. The application before the judge was 
to rectify the register to remove the registration of the name of the person into 
whose name the shares had been transferred. Arnott swore an affidavit that he 
had never sealed the deed. However, the stockbroker gave evidence that he 
had sealed it in his presence and the presence of his clerk, and that whenever 
Arnott signed a transfer form, he invariably put his finger on the printed seal. 
This latter point was denied by Arnott. The judge refused to make an order 
rectifying the register, saying that he was not satisfied that he had sufficient 
materials before him to enable him to decide whose name ought to be on the 
register. He said that the evidence as to whether any form of sealing was gone 
through was conflicting, and that he was not satisfied that any document which 
was complete on the face of it was delivered to the applicant. In the Jones case, 
Buckley L.J. pointed out that the judge in Re Balkis Consolidated Co Ltd “was 
not then reaching a final conclusion that the document in the form in which it 
was could not be found to have been duly executed by Arnott”.28
In the Jackson case, a solicitor obtained his sisters’ signatures to two deeds 
by which they conveyed their shares in a property to him. The deeds were 
not explained to them and they relied on their brother’s statement that he was 
going to clear off the mortgage and send the deeds to the mortgagee. The next 
day, the solicitor deposited the deeds with the plaintiff bank as security for 
a loan, saying that his sisters were assisting with the deeds but that nothing 
would be paid to them. He absconded with the money and the property was 
claimed by the bank as an equitable mortgagee. The claim was resisted by 
the sisters on the ground that the conveyances had been obtained by fraud 
24. Fn.21 above at 230.
25. Fn.21 above at 230.
26. Re Balkis Consolidated Co Ltd (1888) 58 LT 300.
27. National Provisional Bank of England v Jackson (1886) 33 Ch D 1. 
28. Fn.15 above at 116.
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and misrepresentation and were therefore void. They also relied on deeds 
which purported to be reconveyances of the property by their brother to them, 
executed the day before the equitable mortgage was created. These deeds were 
attested by one of their brother’s clerks, but did not bear a seal, just a piece 
of ribbon. Although the claim that the deeds were void did not succeed, the 
court held that the statements made by the solicitor to the bank should have 
put the bank on inquiry, and such an inquiry would have led to the detection 
of the fraud and to a refusal of the advance. Therefore, the bank was fixed 
with constructive notice of the fraud and so its interest had to be postponed to 
the interests of the sisters. In relation to the deeds of reconveyance, Cotton LJ 
stated: 
“In my opinion, the only conclusion we can come to is that these 
instruments were never in fact sealed at all … It is said, and said truly, 
that neither wax nor wafer is necessary in order to constitute a seal to a 
deed … It is true that if the finger be pressed upon the ribbon that may 
amount to sealing, but no such inference can be drawn here where the 
attesting witness who has given evidence recollects nothing of the sort, 
and when Jackson had already committed one fraud in the matter and 
perhaps then intended another.”29
He noted that it was perhaps right to hold that the deed had been sealed 
in the circumstances giving rise to the decision in Re Sandilands, due to the 
certificate of the commissioners, but in the present case it would be wrong to 
do so. Lindley L.J., on the other hand, described Re Sandilands “as a good-
natured decision, in which I am not sure that I could have concurred”.30 He 
noted that it was unimportant what a seal was made of, but there had to be 
something in the nature of an impression on the deed to denote that it had been 
sealed. The reconveyances, in his opinion, were worthless for protecting the 
sisters’ interests.31 In the Jones case, Goff L.J. commented on the Jackson case 
as follows:
“In my judgment, in this day and age, we can, and we ought to, hold 
that a document purporting to be a deed is capable in law of being such 
although it has no more than an indication where the seal should be. 
National Provisional Bank of England v Jackson (1886) 33 Ch D 1, 
which was a decision of this court, does not in any way preclude us from 
arriving at that conclusion, because it was a decision upon the facts. In 
that case the attesting witness gave evidence and was unable to recollect 
any execution of the document by the parties concerned. Moreover, there 
were grounds for suspecting fraud.”32 
29. Fn.27 above at 11.
30. Fn.27 above at 14.
31. Fn.27 above at 14. 
32. Fn.15 above at 119.
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HOATH’S CRITIQUE OF THE JONES CASE
The decision in the Jones case was criticised in an article appearing in Modern 
Law Review in 1980.33 The author, David Hoath, acknowledged that it was well 
worth considering whether the need for sealing should be removed completely, 
but pointed out that this was a task for Parliament and not the courts, as s.73 
of the Law of Property Act 1925 recognises that a seal is a vital part of a 
deed.34 As has already been mentioned, before the enactment of the Land and 
Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009, Irish legislation made no reference to 
the requirement for a seal on deeds executed by individuals35; the requirement 
was thus solely rooted in common law. 
Hoath notes a judicial tendency to adopt a “commercial expediency” 
approach in relation to certain technical property law requirements. The courts, 
in adopting such an approach in cases of unorthodox sealing, acknowledge that 
sealing is of declining practical importance, and suggest that the validity of 
deeds should not depend on too rigid an approach towards sealing. He points 
out that in the Jones case, the court also purported to adopt a “conveyancing 
practice” approach in relation to the sealing requirement. Hoath explains 
that the courts have frequently emphasised the importance of the practice of 
conveyancers as a law-making source, and have been conscious of  “the danger 
of doing anything which may imperil what has been going on for centuries 
among conveyancers”.36 Hoath’s main bone of contention with the decision in 
the Jones case was the emphasis placed by the court on the assumption that it 
was then common business practice to treat a circle at the end of a document as 
being the seal itself. He argued that it was still normal conveyancing practice 
at the time to affix wafer seals to deeds. In his opinion, the presence of a 
circle with the letters “LS” was still commonly regarded as indicating that the 
document was still a draft, or a copy of an engrossed and duly executed deed, or 
the engrossment on which a formal seal would be affixed before or at the time 
of execution. He speculated that the deed in the Jones case could be described 
as falling within the third category and therefore ineffective as a deed, in the 
absence of other evidence of sealing. To support his argument in relation to the 
prevailing conveyancing practice, he quoted a 1963 editorial comment in The 
Conveyancer that the Bar and Bench appeared to be “no longer … familiar with 
the ‘practice of conveyancers’, for this was ‘the almost exclusive province of 
solicitors and the Land Registry’”.37 He also noted that in the Jones case, no 
expert evidence appeared to have been put before the court in relation to the 
33. Fn.5 above.
34. Fn.5 above at 416.
35. Note, however, that s.38 of the Companies Act 1963 specifies that contracts which 
would be required to be made under seal if made between individuals, must be made 
under the seal of the company. Section 64(2)(ii) of the Land and Conveyancing Law 
Reform Act 2009 retains the requirement of sealing documents intended to be deeds for 
companies registered in the State. 
36. Per Chitty J. in Carritt v Real and Personal Advance Co (1889) 42 Ch D 263 at 272.
37. Fn.5 above at 421, quoting the observation of the then editor of The Conveyancer, E.F. 
George, in (1963) 27 Conv. 318.
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practice prevailing at the time in relation to sealing. Even if some solicitors 
had come to regard the circle with the letters “LS” as capable of amounting to 
a seal, Hoath submitted that such a practice was neither sufficiently common 
nor sufficiently ancient to be treated as a law-making source for this purpose. 
He also noted that as a result of the decision in Jones, a document purporting 
to be a deed but not bearing the usual red wafer would stand much more chance 
of being upheld as a deed if it happened to have been drawn up on a standard 
form with a printed circle. He continued,
“Yet it seems strange that the passage of the legal estate in ‘missing seal’ 
cases should depend on the chance of the vendor (or mortgagee, etc) 
having a sufficient turnover of business to warrant the use of printed 
documents (for in practice those purporting to execute deeds are most 
unlikely to draw their own circles thereon). The claims of ‘commercial 
expediency’ were surely outweighed by the disadvantage of producing 
such a capricious result.”38 
Hoath does, however, make the point,
“that a decision against the validity of a document as a deed on the 
ground of sealing does not mean that the document is devoid of effect: 
given the existence of consideration for the transaction, the document 
will normally operate in equity as an enforceable contract for the grant 
of the interest in question, so that ample justice can generally be done 
between the parties”.39 
The writer shall assess the relevance of Hoath’s views in the Irish context. 
However, first, it is necessary to consider one further decision, delivered in the 
aftermath of the Jones case, which is of relevance in considering the validity of 
deeds which bear no obvious evidence of having been sealed.
TCB LTD v GRAY40
The decision in TCB Ltd v Gray considered the requirement for a seal on an 
instrument creating a power of attorney. In this case, the validity of an unlimited 
personal guarantee was challenged. The guarantee had been amended by the 
defendant’s solicitor, as his client’s attorney, to extend beyond the securities 
currently in the possession of the plaintiff bank. The defendant argued that 
the general power of attorney conferred on his solicitor was invalid as it was 
unsealed. It simply contained the standard testimonium and execution clause. 
Despite being pressed by the plaintiff’s counsel with a long line of authorities 
in which the courts adopted a benign approach in relation to the requirement 
38. Fn.5 above at 422.
39. Fn.5 above at 419.
40. [1986] 1 Ch. 621.
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for a seal, Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. noted that no case had been cited to him 
in which the court had gone as far as it would be necessary to go in this case. 
There was nothing in this case to indicate that something amounting to sealing 
took place beyond the fact that the words of the document refer to its having 
been sealed. He concluded on this point: 
“If I were to hold that this document was in fact sealed, I would not only 
be flying in the face of what actually happened, but also disregarding 
the statutory requirement that the document should be sealed. I think it 
would be wrong to extend the legal fiction any further and I decline to 
do so. If it is open to Mr Gray [the defendant] to raise the point, I would 
hold that the power of attorney had not in fact been sealed.”41 
THE IRISH CONTEXT
It is submitted that the decision in TCB Ltd v Gray carries little weight as an 
authority in the modern Irish context, for a number of reasons. First, s.1(1) of 
the Powers of Attorney Act 1971 specifically refers to the requirement for a seal. 
As has already been mentioned, no such requirement has ever been set out by 
Irish legislation in respect of the execution of deeds by individuals. Secondly, 
the solicitor who oversaw the execution of the power admitted that the absence 
of a seal or wafer on the document was an oversight on his part. As shall be 
discussed below, the practice of affixing such wafers in Ireland, although it 
was prevalent at one time, has long since been abandoned. A solicitor based in 
Ireland would not have regarded it as an oversight to fail to affix the red sticker 
before the commencement of the 2009 Act, as the prevailing conveyancing 
practice was to regard the standard testimonium and execution clause as acting 
as a seal. Thirdly, the absence of a seal was easily resolved in this case as the 
doctrine of estoppel was applied, rendering it unnecessary to further extend 
the earlier line of authority. Furthermore, the court accepted that the solicitor 
had, in any event, received express authority from his client over the phone 
to amend the deed, which meant it was unnecessary to rely on the power of 
attorney. 
Given the uncertainty created by some of the English case law, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Woods and Wylie’s third edition of Irish Conveyancing 
Law (published before the 2009 Act) advises solicitors to put “some mark or 
impression” on the deed, “even if only one caused by the end of a ruler, to act 
as the seal”.42 The text includes a footnote reference43 to an article published 
in the Dublin University Law Journal in 1994.44 Although the author of the 
article, Kearney, advises that under Irish law, “as a matter of prudence”, a 
41. [1986] 1 Ch. 621 at 633.
42. (Dublin:Tottel Publishing, 2005), para.18.126.
43. Fn.42 above, see fn.505.
44. P. Kearney, “Execution of Commercial Documents” (1994) 16 Dublin University Law 
Journal 1.
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wafer seal should be affixed to any document which is desired to be sealed, 
he also refers to the views of certain English writers and judges where a less 
stringent approach was taken.45 In a footnote,46 Kearney states: “Presumably 
the rationale of this approach would be equally valid in Ireland.” This writer 
shall argue below that a less stringent approach to the matter of the seal is even 
more appropriate in the Irish context. 
The arguments made by Hoath in his 1980 article are helpful when 
considering the validity of deeds bearing no obvious evidence of a seal in 
the Irish context. Although the demise of the practice of affixing red stickers 
to deeds was a gradual process, anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that it 
was no longer common by the mid- to late 1980s. Since then, deeds have, 
until very recently, included the standard testimonium and execution clause 
which simply refer to the fact that the deed has been sealed. Although the 
commentary on the testimonium in Laffoy’s Irish Conveyancing Precedents 
(the pre-2009 version) refers to signatures and seals, it fails to specify how 
the sealing requirement should be met by individuals executing a deed.47 In 
the pre-2009 editions of the Law Society’s Conveyancing manual,48 again, no 
mention is made of a requirement to use a red sticker to seal a deed executed 
by an individual. It is submitted that conveyancers regarded the red sticker as 
superfluous and were relying on the reference to the seal in the testimonium 
and execution clause as sufficient to seal the deed. Hoath’s doubts about the 
prevalence and longevity of the practice described in the Jones case do not 
apply in the Irish context; the Irish practice has been universally adopted for 
well over 20 years. 
ESTOPPEL
Recent English case law illustrates that where the legal requirements for the 
execution of a deed have not been complied with, a party may be estopped from 
denying that it was properly executed. It is necessary to preface the discussion 
of this case law by emphasising that this estoppel argument is subsidiary to the 
main argument made in this article, that the references to sealing contained in 
the deed are sufficient to seal it.49 In the event that an Irish court rejected this 
argument, it is submitted that the party who had failed to seal the deed would, 
in most circumstances, be estopped from claiming that it was invalid on that 
basis.
45. Fn.44 above at 3.
46. Fn.44 above, see fn.38.
47. See Irish Conveyancing Precedents (Dublin: Butterworths, 1992), Division E, para.5.5, 
and precedent E.1.1.
48. See, for example, G. Brennan and N. Casey (eds.), Law Society of Ireland Conveyancing, 
Vol.1, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), para.8.2.4.14–15.
49. An alternative argument is that the requirement of sealing, being a creature of common 
law, could be discarded by the courts. 
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As was mentioned earlier, in TCB Ltd v Gray,50 Browne-Wilkinson V.-C. 
ruled that it was not open to the defendant to raise the point that the power of 
attorney had not been sealed, since he was estopped from denying that it was 
sealed. The defendant had executed a document drafted as a deed which said 
that he had thereunto set his hand and seal. The document stated that it was 
signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of a witness. There was, therefore, a 
representation of fact that it was in fact sealed. Mr Gray executed the document 
with the intention that it should be relied on as a power of attorney and knowing 
that TCB Ltd were going to rely on it as such. TCB Ltd in fact relied on it to 
their detriment, since they advanced money in reliance on documents executed 
under the power. He concluded that the case had all the necessary elements 
of a classic estoppel. He agreed with Sir David Cairn’s statement in the Jones 
case that it would be lamentable if the validity of documents which did not bear 
evidence of a seal could be successfully challenged. However, he preferred to 
hold that a person so executing a deed is subsequently estopped from denying 
that he has sealed it “rather than to find as a fact that something has occurred 
which we all know has not occurred”.51 
More recently, in Shah v Shah,52 the validity of a deed in which the 
defendants jointly and severally agreed to repay a sum of money which had 
been advanced by the plaintiff was challenged on the basis that the witness 
who attested the defendants’ signatures was not actually present when the 
document was signed. Instead, the signature of the witness was added shortly 
after the defendants had signed the deed. Section 1 of the Law of Property 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 clearly specifies that the witness must 
be present at the time of the signature, and counsel for the defendants sought 
to rely on a statement in Halsbury’s Laws of England: “The doctrine of 
estoppel may not be invoked to render valid a transaction which the legislature 
has, on grounds of general public policy, enacted to be invalid.”53 Pill L.J., 
delivering the decision of the Court of Appeal, noted that the principle set 
out in Halsbury’s Laws was qualified by a footnote reference to Kok Hoong v 
Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd.54 Viscount Radcliffe, delivering the opinion 
of the Privy Council in Kok Hoong, acknowledged that there are statutes which 
“though declaring transactions to be unenforceable or void, are nevertheless 
not essentially prohibitory and so do not preclude estoppels”.55 Pill L.J. also 
quoted the following statement from the judgment of Belham L.J. in Yaxley 
v Gotts: “The general principle that a party cannot rely on an estoppel in the 
face of a statute depends upon the nature of the enactment, the purpose of the 
provision and the social policy behind it.”56 Pill L.J. opined that this was an 
50. Fn.40 above.
51. Fn.40 above at 634.
52. [2002] Q.B. 35. 
53. 4th edn, reissue, Vol.16 (London: LexisNexis Butterworths, 1992), pp.849–850. 
54. [1964] A.C. 993.
55. Fn.54 above at 1015.
56. [2000] Ch. 162 at 191.
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accurate statement of the law of England and Wales. The court is therefore 
entitled to consider the particular statutory provision, its purpose and the social 
policy behind it when deciding whether an estoppel is to be allowed. He noted 
that the willingness of the court in TCB Ltd v Gray57 to allow an estoppel 
when the requirement to establish that the deed had been sealed had not been 
satisfied, supports the view that neither before nor after the passing of the 
1989 Act has there been any general social policy requiring the exclusion of 
estoppel in all circumstances when the validity of a deed is in issue. Pill L.J. 
acknowledged that the requirement for attestation serves a beneficial purpose, 
in that it limits the scope for disputes as to whether the document was signed 
and the circumstances in which it was signed. It confers some protection on 
other parties to a deed who can have more confidence in the genuineness 
of the signature. It is also a safeguard against a person alleging that he was 
induced to execute it by fraud, misrepresentation or duress. In addition, it gives 
some protection to a signatory who may be under a permanent or temporary 
disability. However, he concluded: 
“… [T]here was no statutory intention to exclude the operation of an 
estoppel in all circumstances such as the present. The perceived need 
for formality in the case of a deed requires a signature and a document 
cannot be a deed in the absence of a signature. I can detect no social 
policy which requires the person attesting the signature to be present 
when the document is signed. The attestation is at one stage removed 
from the imperative out of which the need for formality arises. Failure to 
comply with the additional requirement of attestation should not in itself 
prevent a party into whose possession an apparently valid deed has come 
from alleging that the signatory should not be permitted to rely on the 
absence of attestation in his presence … .”58 
In the present case, the delivery of the deed involved a clear representation 
that it had been signed by the defendants in the presence of the witness and 
had, accordingly, been validly executed by them as a deed. The defendant 
signatories well knew that it had not been so signed, but they must be taken 
also to have known that the claimant would assume that it had been so signed 
and that the statutory requirements had accordingly been complied with so as 
to render it a valid deed. They intended the delivery of the deed to be relied on 
as such and it was relied on. In laying down a requirement of attestation in s.1 
of the 1989 Act, Parliament did not, in Pill L.J.’s judgment, intend to exclude 
the possibility that an estoppel could be raised to prevent the signatory relying 
upon the need for the formalities required by that section. 
57. Fn.40 above.
58. Fn.52 at 46.
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CONCLUSION
The social policy behind the common law requirement for a seal was to 
authenticate documents before signatures were relied on for this purpose. It 
is submitted that the Irish courts, if asked to adjudicate on the validity of pre-
December 1, 2009 deeds bearing no obvious evidence of a seal, would take a 
commercially expedient approach in their interpretation of what is sufficient to 
constitute a seal. Such an approach is facilitated by the fact that the requirement 
for a seal on deeds executed by individuals has never been enshrined in Irish 
legislation. This interpretation would recognise the conveyancing practice 
adopted in relation to the execution of deeds over the last 20 years or more, 
which was to regard the reference to the seal in the testimonium and execution 
clause of deeds as sufficient to seal the deed. In the alternative, the grantor 
would clearly be estopped from relying on the absence of a seal, if the deed 
was delivered and intended to be relied on as a properly executed deed.  
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